Paddy Ashdown wrote a thought provoking article in the Independent earlier this week. Within the first few lines he made this bleak statement.
The problem is that we are not winning.
And he is spot on in this assessment, as I have said before we are winning battles but not the war. He explains why we are not winning the war thus:
The reasons for this are many and go much deeper than the wrong equipment and lack of helicopters. Indeed our concentration on “giving our lads the right kit” is in danger of distracting us from the real issue, which is having enough “boots on the ground” to do the job and the right strategy to ensure that tactical military victories no longer get lost in strategic political defeat, because of division amongst the international forces and the lack of a properly integrated plan.
Yes, it’s not that we are haven’t got enough helicopters supplied by “Busta Gut” Ainsworth it’s that we have the complete strategy wrong as Paddy says
We then proceeded to under resource our over ambition by investing in Afghanistan only one-25th of the number of soldiers and one-50th of the amount of aid per head of population that we put into post-war Bosnia – and Afghanistan is much, much more difficult than Bosnia.
Having thus set ourselves up for failure, we made it almost certain by creating an international architecture in Afghanistan that is confused, duplicated, without clear lines of command, devoid of any kind of single workable operational plan, and completely unable to act in a properly co-ordinated way, or speak with a single voice.
So a far too ambitious strategy, no coordination and not enough people on the ground before we even get onto how we are using the people we do have.
Paddy has a look at the strategy on the ground and concludes
But in counter-insurgency operations, the job of the soldier is not to chase the enemy, but to help win the support of the population. Their principal task is not to seek out and kill, but to take ground so that the reconstructors can move in and establish the rule of law, effective governance, the reconnection of water supplies, a basis for economic livelihoods and the framework of a peaceful life, supported by the local population. The short-hand term for this strategy is “clear, hold and build”, with the soldiers clearing and holding, while the re-building takes place in the secure space they have created.
British military commanders in south Helmand first found they did not have enough troops on the ground to carry out this strategy and were then, disastrously, persuaded, for political reasons, that they should ignore this doctrine, first developed by the British Army in Malaya more than half a century ago and still today the inspiration of the US General in charge, David Petraeus, in favour of a misguided attempt to protect President Karzai’s “people”, through a series of “Beau Geste”-like forts spread out across northern Helmand.
In short we are not winning or even trying to win the real war for the peoples “Hearts and Minds”, until we do this there cannot be a victory.
Paddy then has a look at what we are currently doing in Afghanistan and has this this to say
Those who wish to succeed in Afghanistan should recite to themselves ten times a day the words of the Taliban commander who famously said “they may have the watches, but we have the time”. Success in these things requires strategic patience and this too, is a quality which has not been much in evidence so far in Afghanistan.
If we are to win this war we need to look to the long-term, we need to rebuild the country so it can support itself for the long haul not until just the Afghan elections or our elections but until Afghanistan is truly peaceful and self-supporting, a huge ambition really as it has seldom been this in history. As Paddy puts it:
“So the realistic aim in Afghanistan, with current resources, is not victory, but containment. Our success will be measured, not in making things different, but making them better; not in final defeat of the jihadists, but in preventing them from using Afghanistan as a space for their activity. These two aims will be difficult enough to achieve; but they are at least achievable.”
Paddy then offers up his basic priorities for Afghanistan:
- Improving governance, concentrating not, as at present on Kabul, but working with the grain of Afghan tribal and local structures.
- Enlarging the capability of the Afghans themselves, especially in the fields of security and post-conflict reconstruction.
- Widening security with a special emphasis on improving living conditions and creating economic livelihoods. And a major push for the rule of law consistent with Afghan and Islamic traditions.
- A clear strategy for insurgent reconciliation, much as we had for the IRA in Northern Ireland, based on the southern tribes and providing a route back for the Taliban if they commit to pursuing their aims, not through force, but through constitutional means. We need to realise that Taliban fighters are not going to seek a way out through reconciliation while they think they are winning on the battlefield.
and finishes off with this
Is it, then, lost in Afghanistan?
Not yet. We have to hope the new push in the south may begin to reverse the dynamic. On that, the jury is out. But if it does, it is imperative that we do not lose the opportunity that ensues. For we do not have many left.
Well worth reading as it does get to the nub of the problem which is not just more helicopters as our media would have you think.
Paddy Ashdown: What we must do to win this war in Afghanistan – Commentators, Opinion – The Independent.
Recent Comments