RAF Nimrod
Squadron Leader David Tisdale (ret’d), from the UK National Defence Association’s RAF affairs team, looks at the cultural changes that were partly to blame for the Nimrod XV230 disaster
Throughout my RAF career, which spanned 25 years, the concept of flight safety was drummed in to me and my colleagues at all levels. Flight safety briefings were de rigueur, posters extolling the virtues of flight safety adorned every squadron and wing office and we watched many a film produced by the RAF Directorate of Flight Safety. Following the report – by Charles Haddon-Cave QC – into the crash of Nimrod XV230, one is left with the overriding impression that this ‘Flight Safety First’ culture changed over a number of years between 1998 and 2006, but what drove this apparent change?
The problem with Defence is that there is no easy measurement of output; is it flying hours, or perhaps the accuracy of a bomb on target? Is it freight miles flown or battles won? Sadly it is all and yet none of the above. But if you can’t measure output, how then can you gauge efficiency? Or do we just concentrate on input, money spent and savings?
Sadly, since the end of the Cold War the Services have been the victim of just such a philosophy. The etymology of service, dedication and leadership gave way to ever newer management speak, with the emphasis on “New Management Strategies” and “Resource Accounting Budgeting”. Quite rightly, it was said “we knew the cost of everything, and the value of nothing…” Decisions, as the tragic accident to Nimrod XV230 demonstrated, were increasingly made far more for financial reasons rather than for safety.
As Charles Haddon-Cave remarks in chapter 13 of his report: ” [The]MoD suffered a sustained period of deep organisational trauma between 1998 and 2006 due to the imposition of unending cuts and change, which led to a dilution of its safety and airworthiness regime and culture and distraction from airworthiness as the top priority”. All of this tragically underlines what the UKNDA has been saying for a long time – a lack of funding is having profound negative affects upon military effectiveness and safety at all levels – although this was consistently denied by ministers.
However, if the latter is true, and funding is not the whole issue, how did this apparent systemic failure happen? I have no doubt that the professional engineers and aircrew knew that there were serious problems with the Nimrod, but read that these concerns were not always heeded. Indeed, Haddon-Cave seems to confirm this in Chapter 13 of his report. “A Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team Report in 1998 warned of “the conflict between ever reducing resources and … increasing demands; whether they be operational, financial, legislative, or merely those symptomatic of keeping an old ac flying”…These warnings were not sufficiently heeded in the following years”.
If this were indeed the case, what happened to flight safety; what happened to judgement; and what happened to responsibility? Does the Chief Engineer still report to CAS?
Bob Ainsworth, the Secretary of State for Defence, has apologised to the families of the victims of Nimrod XV230 and he should be commended for his honesty and openness. However, this tragedy is a wake up call. Indeed, and most worrying, the situation may not be confined to the Nimrod fleet. The report tells us in chapter 14, “The history of Procurement generally in the MOD has been one of years of major delays and cost over-runs. This has had a malignant effect on In-Service Support and safety and airworthiness generally. Poor Procurement practices have helped create ‘bow waves’ of deferred financial problems, the knock on effects of which have been visited on In-Service Support…”.
Therefore, if this mismatch in funding and the knock on effects identified by Charles Haddon-Cave are not addressed most urgently, something similar may happen again. This is why the UKNDA will continue to press the government to reverses the recent defence budget reductions (over £2bn this year) and provide adequate funds for our armed forces to undertake the tasks they are assigned in the most professional and safest way possible. Charles Haddon-Cave is to be commended for his report, which, if as is hoped, it is heeded, may benefit all our armed forces.
Not much for me say on this other than to agree.
We see this has happened throughout many business’s now, and that is what the Defence has now become, an attitude of ticking boxes rather than performing the actual function. If a box has been ticked then everything is OK, no real thought, no use of common-sense, just arse-covering and shifting of the responsibility.
Finance vs. flight safety – a tragedy waiting to happen – Defence Management.
Recent Comments