Fitaloon at MicroShaft

Statement available here shortly

BBC – Democracy Live – Nimrod statement.

A day after the government announced it’s intention to raid the coffers of the defence budget to fund Afghanistan, despite its assurances they would found the war from Treasury reserves, we get the unconnected news that the Government Response to the damning report  into the loss of  Nimrod XV230 will be released today.

Any disbelief that the early phasing out of the Nimrod MR2’s is connected to this is purely in my mind. The report released in October’s independent review into the 2006 crash in Afghanistan accused the MoD of sacrificing safety to cut costs.

The investigation ruled the incident, caused by a fuel leak, was preventable.

Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth apologised to victims’ families at the time of the report, and will now make a statement to the House of Commons.

The critical report, by Charles Haddon-Cave QC, said the Afghanistan crash occurred because of a “systemic breach” of the military covenant.

And a safety review of the Nimrod MR2 carried out by the MoD, BAE Systems and QinetiQ was branded a “lamentable job”.

BBC News – Response due over RAF Kinloss Nimrod tragedy report.

RAF Nimrod

Squadron Leader David Tisdale (ret’d), from the UK National Defence Association’s RAF affairs team, looks at the cultural changes that were partly to blame for the Nimrod XV230 disaster

Throughout my RAF career, which spanned 25 years, the concept of flight safety was drummed in to me and my colleagues at all levels. Flight safety briefings were de rigueur, posters extolling the virtues of flight safety adorned every squadron and wing office and we watched many a film produced by the RAF Directorate of Flight Safety. Following the report – by Charles Haddon-Cave QC – into the crash of Nimrod XV230, one is left with the overriding impression that this ‘Flight Safety First’ culture changed over a number of years between 1998 and 2006, but what drove this apparent change?

The problem with Defence is that there is no easy measurement of output; is it flying hours, or perhaps the accuracy of a bomb on target? Is it freight miles flown or battles won? Sadly it is all and yet none of the above. But if you can’t measure output, how then can you gauge efficiency? Or do we just concentrate on input, money spent and savings?

Sadly, since the end of the Cold War the Services have been the victim of just such a philosophy. The etymology of service, dedication and leadership gave way to ever newer management speak, with the emphasis on “New Management Strategies” and “Resource Accounting Budgeting”. Quite rightly, it was said “we knew the cost of everything, and the value of nothing…” Decisions, as the tragic accident to Nimrod XV230 demonstrated, were increasingly made far more for financial reasons rather than for safety.

As Charles Haddon-Cave remarks in chapter 13 of his report: ” [The]MoD suffered a sustained period of deep organisational trauma between 1998 and 2006 due to the imposition of unending cuts and change, which led to a dilution of its safety and airworthiness regime and culture and distraction from airworthiness as the top priority”. All of this tragically underlines what the UKNDA has been saying for a long time – a lack of funding is having profound negative affects upon military effectiveness and safety at all levels – although this was consistently denied by ministers.

However, if the latter is true, and funding is not the whole issue, how did this apparent systemic failure happen? I have no doubt that the professional engineers and aircrew knew that there were serious problems with the Nimrod, but read that these concerns were not always heeded. Indeed, Haddon-Cave seems to confirm this in Chapter 13 of his report. “A Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team Report in 1998 warned of “the conflict between ever reducing resources and … increasing demands; whether they be operational, financial, legislative, or merely those symptomatic of keeping an old ac flying”…These warnings were not sufficiently heeded in the following years”.

If this were indeed the case, what happened to flight safety; what happened to judgement; and what happened to responsibility? Does the Chief Engineer still report to CAS?

Bob Ainsworth, the Secretary of State for Defence, has apologised to the families of the victims of Nimrod XV230 and he should be commended for his honesty and openness. However, this tragedy is a wake up call. Indeed, and most worrying, the situation may not be confined to the Nimrod fleet. The report tells us in chapter 14, “The history of Procurement generally in the MOD has been one of years of major delays and cost over-runs. This has had a malignant effect on In-Service Support and safety and airworthiness generally. Poor Procurement practices have helped create ‘bow waves’ of deferred financial problems, the knock on effects of which have been visited on In-Service Support…”.

Therefore, if this mismatch in funding and the knock on effects identified by Charles Haddon-Cave are not addressed most urgently, something similar may happen again. This is why the UKNDA will continue to press the government to reverses the recent defence budget reductions (over £2bn this year) and provide adequate funds for our armed forces to undertake the tasks they are assigned in the most professional and safest way possible. Charles Haddon-Cave is to be commended for his report, which, if as is hoped, it is heeded, may benefit all our armed forces.

Not much for me say on this other than to agree.

We see this has happened throughout many business’s now, and that is what the Defence has now become, an attitude of ticking boxes rather than performing the actual function. If a box has been ticked then everything is OK, no real thought, no use of common-sense, just arse-covering and shifting of the responsibility.

Finance vs. flight safety – a tragedy waiting to happen – Defence Management.

More on this later but according to the BBC

The highly critical report, by Charles Haddon-Cave QC, said the Afghanistan crash occurred because of a “systemic breach” of the military covenant.

A safety review of the Nimrod MR2 carried out by the MoD, BAE Systems and QinetiQ was branded a “lamentable job”.

Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth apologised to victims’ families.

Mr Haddon-Cave condemned the change of organisational culture within the MoD between 1998 and 2006, when financial targets came to distract from safety.

He quoted a former senior RAF officer who told his inquiry: “There was no doubt that the culture of the time had switched.

“In the days of the RAF chief engineer in the 1990s, you had to be on top of airworthiness.

“By 2004 you had to be on top of your budget if you wanted to get ahead.”

Mr Haddon-Cave’s report also criticised two RAF officers.

Answorth is the man who told us the Nimrod was airworthy. He lied then and should go.

BBC NEWS | UK | Nimrod review reveals ‘failures’.

The long awaited Independent review into the fatal Nimrod crash in Afghanistan will be presented to day and is unlikely to be happy reading for a number of parties. I have blogged on this on a number of occasions

It’s interesting to hear also (via Radio Scotland) that of the RAF’s current 11 Nimrods, none are currently deemed “airworthy”, 2 because of bird strikes but 9 because of longer term maintenance I assume associated with the issues raised by the crash.

Bob Ainsworth will of course repeat his mantra of

“report by QinetiQ on the Nimrod has been received and it does not identify any significant airworthiness issues”.

I suggest that this lie will be even more exposed after today’s report.

BBC NEWS | UK | Nimrod review to reveal failures.